Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

Western Capital and Securities, Inc. v. Helen
Knudsvig : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig F. McCullough; Attorney for Appellant.
Gerald S. Wight; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Western Capital and Securities v. Knudsvig, No. 880198 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/965

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

v»
UTAH
DOCUMENT
SO

^gTNoJfl<W

TIT

mn^ SUPREME
STATE OF

WESTERN CAPITAL AND
SECURITIES, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs,
HELEN KNUDSVIG,

IB
iUlilHflM

I

Defendant and
Respondent.

CRAIG F. MCCULLOUGH, #2166
5 M South State Suite 520
P.O. Box 1J-378
84147-q
Salt Lake City, Utah
lAtt0

plaIntfff-APPellant)
, Jttft

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

3

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

3

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NO
CAUSE OF ACTION, WAS AMPLY JUSTIFIED BY
THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT AND WAS A
LAWFUL EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION

9

POINT II.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE RULE 10(b)5, IS AMPLY SUPPORTED
BY THE FACTS AND IS A PROPER APPLICATION
OF THE LAW
POINT III.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE RULE 10(b)10, WAS A PROPER
APPLICATIONS OF LAW AND FACT AND SHOULD
BE SUSTAINED
,
POINT IV.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF
VIOLATION OF VARIOUS NASD RULES HAS
AMPLE JUSTIFICATION IN LAW AND FACT

2

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN RENDERINT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

24

POINT VI.
THAT ANY AND ALL FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL
COURT WERE JUSTIFIED AND WERE AMPLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW AS
DETERMINED BY THE COURT
CONCLUSION

28
28

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE CITATIONS
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp, 193 F2d 461 . . . .

16

Blue Chip Stamps et al v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 US 723

16

Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236

10

Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, 410 F2d 135

22

Clayton v. Crossroads, 655 P.2d 1125

25

Coffee v. Premium, 474 F2d 1040

25

Colonia Realty v. Bache, 358 F2d 178

22

Cowen & Company v. Atlas Stock Transfer,
695 P.2d 109

22

E.F. Hutton v. Penham, 547 F. Supp. 1286

20

First Security Bank v. Hall, 504 P.2d 995

9

Gerant v. Dean Whitter, 502 F2d 854

22

Geyer v. Paine Weber, 389 F. Supp 678

22

Hardy v. Hendricksen, 495 P.2d 28

.

10

Huddles ton v. MacLean, 640 F2d 554

19

Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714

10

Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043

10

Maby v. Kay Peterson, 682 P.2d 287

25

Nash v. Craigco, 585 P.2d 775

27

Nye v. Blythe Eastman Dillon, 588 F2d 1191

24

Pretrites v. Bradford, 656 F2d 1033

25

Ream v. Fitzon, 581 P.2d 145

9

Riggle v. Daines, 463 P.2d 1

10

Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 US 462

16

SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 357 US 180 . .

20

Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197

10

Stole v. Ted S. Finkle Investment Services,
489 F. Supp. 1209

26

Sutton v. Schierson, 490 F. Supp. 98

26

University v. Bear Stearns, 549 F2d 164

22

U.S. v. Naftalin, 441 US 768

20

Valley Bank v. First Security Bank, 538 P.2d 298 . .

9

Washamatic v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682

9

AGENCY RULES
NASD Rules § 12

23

NASD Rules § 18

23

New York Stock Exchange Rule 405

22

Securities and Exchange Rule 10(b)5

2, 3
16,20
24,25
2, 3
20,21
25

Securities and Exchange Rule 10(b)10

STATUTES
Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-8-315

12,13
23

Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-8-319

12

Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-8-401

23

-ii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN CAPITAL AND SECURITIES
INC.,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
CASE NO:

870056

vs.
HELEN KNUDSVIG,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment of the District
Court of Weber County, State of Utah,
Honorable John F. Wahlguist, Judge

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.
The decision of the trial court in dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint no cause of action, was amply justified by
the facts before the Court and was a lawful exercise of
Judicial discretion.
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II.
That
violated

the

trial

Securities

court's
and

finding

Exchange

that Plaintiff

Rule

had

10(b)5, is amply

supported by the facts and is a proper application of the
Law.

III.
That

the

trial

court's

finding

that

Plaintiff

had

violated Securities and Exchange Rule 10(b)10, was a proper
applications of law and fact and should be sustained.

IV.
That the trial court's finding of violation of various
NASD Rules has ample justification in law and fact.

V.
The trial court was justified in rendering Judgment
against the Plaintiff for punitive damages.

VI.
That any and all findings by the trial court were
justified and were amply supported by the evidence and the
law as determined by the Court.
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was an action in which the Plaintiff was found to
have violated Rules 10(b)5 and 10(b)10, and various Rules of
the NASD and having defrauded

the Defendant and others

through the illegal use of insider information.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a two-day trial before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, the District Court determined that there had been
a violation of Rule 10(b)5 and 10(b)10 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, and further, that the Plaintiff had
violated various NASD Rules and that it specifically set out
to defraud the Defendant and others through illegal trading
and use of insider information.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent

seek affirmation of the Judgment of the

Lower Court as to the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint no
cause of action and the awarding of $30,000.00 worth of
stock to Defendant in addition to $10,000.00 in punitive
damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
First it should be noted that Respondent takes exception

to

the

Appellantfs

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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of

Facts

as

being

argumentative and not supported by the testimony referred
to,

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
That the Defendant

is a 61 year old

lady who has

habitually dabbled in penny stocks, usually in the amount of
a few hundred dollars or lessf investing in new issues which
would hopefully achieve a quick rise in value.

(T. 399)

That Plaintiff attempted to establish that the Defendant was
an experienced

and

sophisticated

contrary to the facts.

investor, but

this is

(T. 555)

That in 1984 the Defendant bought $200.00 worth of
penny stocks in a company known as Venture Consolidated,
which amounted at that time to 20,000 shares.

The particu-

lar stock was a new issue and a typical penny stock offering
and the corporation Appellant was the market maker of the
issue in any market which would follow.
549)

(T. 506, 517 and

The plan was to sell 100 million shares and insiders

eventually captured 23% of the actual 200,000 plus shares
which were sold while the public holding was to remain at
$200,000.00.

(T. 506, 517, 518 and 549)

The investment was to be held in cash with the plan to
be that at a shareholders meeting a merger and consolidation
with several other corporations would be made, with the
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resulting entity to be known as Tires, Inc., authorizing a
20 to 1 reverse stock split taking place immediately thereafter.

The particular

September 19, 1984.

shareholders meeting to occur on

(T. 531 and 532)

In the meantime,

Venture Consolidated stock rose from 1* to 16* or 17*, sole
reason

for the rise being

the proposed merger

and the

general market making activities of the Plaintiff Brokerage.
(T. 531, 532 577 - 600)
The result of the activities of the Appellant and
others was the consistent rise in value of Venture Consolidated and eventually Tires, Inc., stocks.
the Defendant's

original

$200.00

It resulted in

investment

being worth

approximately $30,000.00 at the time of trial based again
upon the general market making activities of the Plaintiff
Brokerage and/or other insiders activity.

(T. 531, 571 and

592 - 600) .
That the Appellant had at all times maintained an Ogden
office with an account executive in that office Lou Babcock,
who was well acquainted with Respondent.
557)

(T. 461 - 471 and

That Mr. Babcock visited with the Defendant on Septem-

ber 14, 1984, and advised her of the stocks recent climb in
value and offered to sell it for her, (T. 467) and that such
a sale would bring on the recording of an additional indication of an increase of fixed value for the market making
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activity and would serve also to pick up the stock in the
face of what appeared to be high-promotional activity in
order to prevent profit taking before the explosion in value
which was about to occur.

(T. 531, 532 and 571)

While the

motive to sell the stocks on commission was no doubt present , any such commission would be very small.
That the Respondent was excited about the potential
rise in value and decided to obtain a second opinion by
placing a call to the Appellant's Salt Lake office and
requesting further information.

(T. 443)

That the broker

who received the call interpreted the conversation to be a
request for a sale of shares and that he contacted the
Vice-President for instructions on how to handle a sale in
as much as there was no stock certificate with the Plaintiff
Brokerage. (T. 454, 455)
culty,

the

In spite of this perceived diffi-

Vice-President

of

the

brokerage

immediately

approved the sale and the brokerage then made an entry that
the purchase was made for their own market making account.
(T. 451, 452)
That the Appellant failed to give notice of the transaction as required by its own agreement with Respondent, in
addition to the SEC Rules and NASD Rules.
471, 435, and 505)
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(T. 404, 459 -

That Respondent had no intention of making a sale of
her shares and was aware of the fact that such a sale could
not take place without the presence of a stock certificate,
Appellant in the past had such a sale cancelled as opposed
to having the purchase made by the broker to cover what is
known as a "short sale".

(T. 565)

That one of the reasons

Respondent never received a stock certificate is that it
would serve the personal interests of insiders market making
activity to freeze outsiders and prevent their profit taking
and interference with the stockfs rise by making it more
difficult for them to profit-take.

(T. 571)

That regulations in the broker's contract itself with
the Defendant required a winding up and closing of all
transactions within five (5) days after a sale or purchase
occurs.

(T. 552 and 451 - 455)

That the Appellant make no

effort to close in the required five (5) day period, and
that they in fact preferred not to do so, preferring instead
to await further developments.

(T. 456 through 458 and 527

- 529)
That the stock rose uniformly through the next period
of time without any drop below the sales price so that the
brokerage's position would not in any way be threatened.
(T. 456 - 458 and 527 - 529)

That after approximately 75

days, the Plaintiff decided to make a transfer purporting to
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cover the short, making an entry that they had bought from
their own profit-making account.

(T. 5 23)

That this resulted in a paper calculation that if the
sale was made in accordance with the original sales entry
and a short coverage was effected at the repurchase date,
that

the

Defendant

would

owe

the

$5,400.00

claimed

in

Plciintiff's Complaint because of the steady rise of the
market

during

dalliance.

the

intervening

75

days

of

Appellant's

That Appellant knew that it would not be closing

within five (5) days, even assuming that the original sale
had actually taken place and let the matter ride at the
Defendant's risk and should now be estopped to make any
claim against the Respondent.

(T. 451 - 459)

That the Appellant brokerage suffered no damage in that
the entries made were strictly to and from their own market
making accounts and records, and there is no evidence to
estciblish that they were ever in any way threatened in their
position.

(T. 451 - 459, 523 and 524)

That Defendant's

shares could not be sold without possession of the certificate.

(T. 452 - 455)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
That there is clear evidence to support the finding of
the Trial Court as to the violation of Rule 10(b) 5 and
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10(b) 10 and the NASD Rules and the use of insider information in attempting to defraud the Respondent and others, and
that the ruling of the Court is amply supported both by the
facts determined and also by the Case Law.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NO
CAUSE OF ACTION, WAS AMPLY JUSTIFIED BY
THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT AND WAS A
LAWFUL EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION.
This Court has previously ruled in Valley Bank v. First
Security Bank, 538 P. 2d 298, that in a case at law, the
Trial Court is accorded the right to find facts and such
finding will not be disturbed even though the Supreme Court
may disagree.

See also, Washamatic v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682.

In fact, such findings by the Trial Judge will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of
evidence, First Security Bank v. Hall, 504 P.2d 995. Where
the action was a matter in law and not in equity, the
Supreme Court is in fact precluded from substituting its
view of the evidence for the Trial Court's, Ream v. Fitzon,
581 P. 2d 145, and on appeal the evidence will be viewed in
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the light most favorable to sustaining the Lower Court's
ruling.

Hardy v. Hendricksen, 495 P.2d 28.

This is because the Trial Court is in a unique position
to observe witnesses and hear testimony which places it in a
better

position

than

the Appellate

evaluate the testimony and evidence.

Court

to weigh

and

Shioji v. Shioji, 712

P.2d 197.
This Court has further found in the case of Kimball v.
Campbell, 699 P. 2d 714, that in interpreting a contract,
findings with regard to the same are strictly limited on
review where they are based simply on testimony.
That even where facts may be found to be conflicting,
when the facts found by the Trial Court are supported by
substantial

evidence,

they

will

Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236.

be

summarily

affirmed,

This is true even where

reasonable men may differ and the Trial Court is simply left
with the decision as to chose who to believe.

Koeslmg v.

Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, Riggle v. Daines, 463 P.2d 1.
As has been demonstrated by the references and the
findings of fact, there is ample authority to support the
Court's finding that no sale of stock had been made.
423 - 430, 435, 467, 471, 474, 475, 477)

(T.

It is further

obvious that the activities of the brokerage firm are in
violation of their own agreement setting up the account

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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which is identified as Exhibit IP.

(T. 537)

Contrary to

the case law that has previously been cited by Respondent,
Appellant would have the Court rely solely upon the testimony of a Mr. Davis, who made self-serving statement on behalf
of his then employer.
At the same time, Appellant is asking that the Court
disregard the testimony of Mr. Knudsvig, the Respondent,
Mrs. Knudsvig, Lou Babcock, an employee of Appellant at the
time, Mr. Johnson, an employee of the Appellant at the time,
and the total lack of documentation of proper procedure.
(T. 403, 404, 423 - 439, 461 - 490, and 505)

In addition,

Appellant would attempt to mislead the Court into believing
their version of the testimony which is not supported in any
way by the actual transcript, such as their statement on
page 12 of their Brief that Lou Babcockfs testimony was that
Defendant knew of the sale and she intended to complete her
portion of the sale, where in reality throughout his entire
testimony, he restates the fact that she never agreed to any
sale.

Appellant also misstates the finding of the District

Court that Respondent had requested

the sale, which is

totally contrary to said finding. (R. 288 - 290)
The actual finding by the Court is as follows:
"That the Defendant became excited about
the potential rise in value and decided
to obtain a second opinion by placing a
call to the Salt Lake office and
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requesting further information.
That
the broker who received the call interpreted the conversation to be a request
for a sale of her shares and he then
contacted the Vice-President of the
brokerage for further instructions on
what to do in as much as he knew that
there was no stock certificate with the
Plaintiff brokerage,...that the Defendant had no intention of making a sale
of her shares and was aware of the fact
that such a sale could not take place
without the presence of a stock certificate, and had in the past had such a
sale cancelled as opposed to having the
purchase made by the broker to cover
what is known as a short sale."
Thus, Appellant has deliberately attempted to deceive the
Court as to what the previous ruling of the District Court
was, and attempts to also do so in its Statement of Facts
and Arguments by repeatedly misquoting the testimony from
the Transcript.
Appellant attempts to cite § 70A-8-319 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in support of its position, but at the same
time would apparently desire to disregard § 70A-8-315 which
states:
"Any person against whom the transfer of
a security is wrongful for any reason,
including his incapacity, may against
anyone except the bona fide purchaser,
reclaim possession of the security or
obtain possession of any new security
evidencing all or part of the same
rights, or have damages."
In this case the overwhelming weight of evidence supports
the Trial Judge's finding and decision that there was no

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

12

sale and that the attempt to claim a sale was solely to
support the market-making activity and insider trading of
the Appellant to take illegal profits therefrom.

Based upon

such finding and § 70A-8-315, the finding of the Court that
no such sale had taken place and that there was no basis for
the suit by Appellant, and the other various illegal activities of Western Capital and Securities, Inc., amply justifies the dismissal of their Complaint, the awarding to the
Respondent of her shares of stock, and the awarding of
$10,000.00 in punitive damages.
It should further be pointed out that Appellant repeatedly claims that a confirmation was sent to Respondent, yet
Respondent's

husband,

the

Respondent

herself,

and

the

account executive all testified that they were not aware of
and had never seen any such confirmation.

(T. 404, 427 -

430, 459, 479)
In

addition, Appellant

was

unable

to

provide

any

original of the confirmation, even though testimony clearly
established that two (2) original copies of the same were
normally retained at least until the settlement date, (T.
510, 521) thus the Court was convinced that there never in
fact had been a confirmation, and that the requirement to
provide such a confirmation on the part of Western Capital

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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and Securities, Inc., according

to the Rules and Regu-

lations, had never been fulfilled.
Instead, Appellant would have this Court believe that
they simply waited for a period of 75 days without any stock
certificate, holding the account open because Respondent was
such

a valued

willing

customer

of penny

to sit and do nothing

stocks, and

they were

in the face of steadily

increasing price of the stock, even though they had testified that they had never done it for any other party. (T.
454 - 458, 524)
It is also not surprising

that the Court chose to

disbelieve testimony by officials of Western Capital and
Securities, as

it was demonstrated

on at least several

occasions that they were either lying or had changed their
testimony from previous statements under oath.
For example, Mr. Johnson claims that he has a social
security

number

matching

that

of Respondent, while

the

agreement setting up the account doesn't carry any such
social security number and no other documents were produced
showing the same, and Respondent believes that it was simply
obtained subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit.

(T. 400,

503)
Mr. Johnson further testifies that he actually believed
that the value of the stock was about to decrease at the
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time that the purported sale was to have taken place, while
in his previously filed Answers to Interrogatories under
oath, had stated that they fully believed that they would
increase.
When

(T. 531)
asked

about

a

previous

suit

brought

against

Western Capital and Securities alleging securities fraud,
Mr. Johnson conveniently could not recall any details of
that suit, even though he had previously filed a specific
response to questions about the same in Answers to Interrogatories.

(T. 537)

Mr. Johnson further states that he was not required to
settle the accounts within any specific time period, notwithstanding the fact that he acknowledges the provisions
found on the back of the account agreement.

(T. 539)

Mr. Parker, while testifying on behalf of the Appellant, attempted to convince the Court that Respondent was a
sophisticated investor with great experience in the stock
market.

(T. 555)

This claim by Parker was found by the

Court to be totally and blatantly false based upon the fact
that

Respondent was

a

simple

individual

having

had

no

employment in the securities field, and having only occasionally dabbled in penny stocks in the amount of a few
hundred dollars or as much as she was able to lose.
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POINT II.

THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE RULE 10(b)5, IS AMPLY SUPPORTED
BY THE FACTS AND IS A PROPER APPLICATION
OF THE LAW.
With regard to the requirements to establish a 10(b)5
violation, Respondent will take exception with the requirements as set forth by Appellant as the same has already
clearly been defined by the United States Supreme Court in
the case of Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 US 462, as
follows:
1.

The use of a means or instrumentality of inter-

state commerce or the mail.
2.

A material misrepresentation.

3#

An actual intent to deceive, manipulate or de-

fraud, otherwise known as scienter.
4.

That damages are suffered due to the fraudulent

scheme.
Appellant misquotes two cases that it claims supports
its position that would deny Respondent a cause of action.
Both of the cases quoted, that being Blue Chip Stamps et al
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723 and Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F2d 461, established the proposition that
no

suit

could

be

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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10(b)5

for

corporate

mismanagement and have nothing to do with the fraudulent
activities of brokers or stock dealers*
Appellant now tries to claim, surprisingly, that there
was no sale of security involved and that this would thus
serve to defeat any claim by Respondent.

This is obviously

contrary to the testimony of its own officers wherein Mr*
Johnson testified that the sale was completed by Western
Capital and Securities act of buying in to cover the short*
(T. 527)

Thus, Appellant is now found in the position of

arguing and against its own officers1 testimony and its own
previous position as set forth in its Complaint and also in
our Point I of its Brief on Appeal.

Surely the activities

on the part of Western Capital and Securities were with the
intent of claiming that there had been a concluded, completed sale as evidenced by the confirmation November 30th,
showing the buy-in.
With

regard

to

the

material

misrepresentation

and

attempt to deceive or defraud requirements, this has clearly
been established by the findings of the Court and is most
clearly stated on page 6 of the Memorandum Decision entitled
"Damages":
"The Court considers that the alleged
sale never occurred pursuant to the
contract. The Court does, however, find
that the Plaintiff's activity in this
instance is unconscionable.
It knew
early that the Defendant had denied the
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original sale had been made, but nevertheless , the brokerage took no action to
close the transaction within the five
(5) days. It left the situation in an
ambiguous state. Its intent was that
they could make a profit on the stocks
generally held in the market-making
account with the risk only to the
Defendant because the stocks rise in
value was consistent.
The Court is
mindful that the evidence in general
discloses a relatively large brokerage
business which has branch offices, makes
prices, invests for its own purposes,
etc. The Court is also mindful of the
vulnerability of persons in the Defendant's position. It is obvious that the
penny market stock market is one that
attracts persons that might otherwise be
in the lottery ticket person class. The
purchases are generally sufficiently
small that they cannot afford litigation
if treated unfairly.
The deliberate
failure to move towards the closing of a
transaction, even if they were correct
that a sale occurred and an agreement
had taken place, their motive was to
hold at the Defendant's expense for the
period over the five (5) day maximum or
on into what they have testified is the
right to hold indefinitely and their
tying up of the stock certificate
requiring lengthly litigation and all
results in general cheat of a public
that is near helpless."
Also on page 2 of the Memorandum Decision and page 275
of the transcript, the Court states:

"A plan was developed wherein a shareholders meeting was to be called to
bring about a stock transfer with Tires,
Inc., at a 20 to 1 reverse split. This
was to occur on October 19, 1986. In
the meantime the Venture Consolidated
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stock rose from 1C to 16C or 17C. There
is no evidence as to why the stock value
rose, except the proposed merger and the
general market-making
activities of
Plaintiff brokerage. There is nothing
like discovery of oil on the adjoining
property in evidence. The bottom line
seems to be that a cash injection of
something like $200,000.00 was to raise
the value of Venture Consolidated to
many times the invested value and to
further raise the Tires, Inc., stocks.
The result was that this $200.00 investment has a market value of in the
neighborhood of $30,000.00 at trial
time. The evidence offers no explanation for this rise except a general
market-making activities of the Plaintiff brokerage and/or other insiders
activity."
This ruling in the Court's Memorandum Decision clearly
evidences illegal and fraudulent activity on the part of
Western Capital and Securities, all to the detriment of
Respondent.

They materially misrepresented that they had

sold Respondent's stock when in reality they were simply
attempting to freeze holdings of other parties so as to
enhance their own position.

The Court specifically found

from this an intent to manipulate and defraud the market in
this particular stock.
In the case of Huddleston v. MacLean, 640 F2d 534, the
Court found that scienter could be established by proof of
conduct which is so extreme as to be a form of intentional
conduct and behavior equivalent to an intent to deceive,
manipulate

or

defraud.
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Court

further

found

that

extrinsic facts could be used to establish scienter in a
10(b)5

action/

and

then

looked

at

whether

Defendant's

actions violated the standard of care of a securities broker
or dealer or one in a fiduciary capacity and that such is a
question

of

fact to be determined

by

the Trial Court,

Further, in the case of E,F. Button v. Penham, 547 F. Supp.
1286f there is recognized a specific right of action for
unauthorized

trading in individual securities*

See also

U.S. v, Naftalin, 441 US 768.
In the case of SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 US 180/ the Court held that the purpose of 10(b)5 was to
provide investor protection and a high standard of business
ethics in every facet of the securities industry.

Western

Capital

of

and

Securities

intentional

manipulation

the

market and attempt at unauthorized trade with Plaintiff's
stock specifically violated those rules.

POINT III.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE RULE 10(b)10, WAS A PROPER
APPLICATIONS OF LAW AND FACT AND SHOULD
BE SUSTAINED.
With regard to Rule 10(b)10, it specifically provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any broker or
dealer to effect for or with the account
of a customer, any transaction in, or to
induce the purchase or sale by such
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customer of, any security unless such
broker or dealer, at or before completion of such transaction, gives or
sends to such customer written notification disclosing."
Rule 10(b)10 then goes on to require certain specific
information with regard to any trades or transactions on a
customer's account.
The Court has specifically found, and this has been
born out by the evidence already identified in Argument I,
that no such confirmation as required by 10 (b) 10 was ever
sent or received by Respondent and the illegal and fraudulent activity and dealings on the part of Western Capital
and Securities in connection with the sale has already been
detailed in Argument II.

With regard to the showing of

damages, Mrs. Knudsvig testified at length as to her damages
the fact that she couldn't pay normal living expenses and
the mental pain and suffering that she had undergone because
of the activities conducted by Western Capital and Securities.

POINT IV.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF
VIOLATION OF VARIOUS NASD RULES HAS
AMPLE JUSTIFICATION IN LAW AND FACT.
Appellant attempts to argue that there is no private
right of action under NASD Rules, which is contrary to
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numerous holdings by the Federal Court and also specifically
a previous holding of this Court.

In the case of Utah State

University v. Bear Stearns, 549 F2d 164, the 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals in ruling on an appeal from the District
Court

of

Utah,

specifically

finds

that

a violation

of

association or exchange rules may give rise to a private
cause of action requiring only the showing on the part of
the broker of a manipulative or fraudulent practice.

Also

another Circuit in Colonia Realty v. Bache, 358 F2d 178,
recognizes a private cause of action where the Rule violated
amounts to a substitute for SEC regulation and established
an explicit duty previously unknown to common law.
The District Court in Geyer v. Paine Weber, 389 F. Supp
678, also finds such a private right of action as does
Gerant v. Dean Whitter, 502 F2d 854, particularly where
there is a fraudulent conversion of securities.
7th Circuit

in Buttrey

v. Merrill

Also, the

Lynch, 410 F2d 135,

recognized a private right of action for violation of New
York

Stock

Exchange

Rule

405

and

the

determination

of

whether or not such a violation is actionable, is as to
whether or not such rule was created for the direct protection of investors.

Finally this Court in the case of

Cowen & Company v. Atlas Stock Transfer, 695 P.2d 109,
states:
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"Industry practice and NASD Rules and
Regulations required Cowen to make
delivery of the stock to purchasers
within five (5) business days of each
sale."
The Court in that case then went on to find that the
failure to follow a prescribed rules and regulations gave
rise to a cause of action for damages and affirmed such an
award by the Trial Court.

The Court further found that

provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code as found in §
70A-8-401 were applicable in such cases and that they should
be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
In the present case, another section of the Uniform
Commercial Code previously cited to, that being § 70A-8-315,
also provides for the awarding of damages in connection with
a wrongful transfer of security and specifically provides
for damages.

A fraudulent and manipulative activity on the

part of Western Capital and Securities has already been gone
into at length, but they are clearly sufficient to make out
a cause of action for violation of the NASD Rules.
compliance

with

the

rules

is

specifically

required

That
by

Exhibit IP.
Appellant makes reference to the fact that § 12 requires the delivery of a confirmation and the Court very
clearly found in its ruling that there had been no such
delivery.

Also

as

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

stated,

§

23

18 prohibits

the

use of

fraudulent or manipulative devices in connection with the
sale of security, closely paralleling
Court also found.

10(b)5, which the

Section 21 requires certain bookkeeping

practices on the part of the securities dealer and it is
obvious that this was not done based upon the fact that no
confirmation was ever made or delivered, the sale was not
terminated when there was no stock certificate, and Western
Capital and Securities further proceeded with an illegal
sale by the buying-in from securities maintained in its own
account.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
Appellant

argues

that there can be no recovery of

punitive damages in a 10(b)5 setting and apparently would
desire the Court to totally disregard the long line of cases
specifically allowing such an award where a State violation
is joined with the 10(b) violation.

In the case of Nye v.

Blythe Eastman Dillon, 588 F2d 1191, the Court specifically
found that punitive damages may be awarded if allowed under
State law and a State violation is joined with 10(b)5.

The

Court also found that punitive damages were intended to
punish malicious or oppressive conduct and to prevent it
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occurring in the future.

In this case a breach of contract

in violation of the Uniform Commercial Code and NASD Rules
is included along with the 10(b)5 and 10(b)10 violation and
would certainly justify the awarding of punitive damages to
punish malicious and oppressive conduct and to prevent its
occurring in the future.
Also, in the case of Pretrites v. Bradford, 656 F2d
1033, the Court found that punitive damages may be recovered
along with attorney fees because the claim also included
with it a claim under the Florida Blue Sky Laws, and specifically states that Florida Law applies to negotiating for
the sale of a security in any manner whatever, similar to
the provisions of § 70A-8-315 of the Utah Code.

The Court

in that case felt that punitive damages were particularly
appropriate where part of the claim was for a common law
fraud count including activity on the part of the brokerage
known as "Churning" or the stirring up and creating of a
market such as was done by Western Capital and Securities.
(T. 549)

See also Coffee v. Premium, 474 F2d 1040.

In order to set aside any awarding of punitive damages,
the Court must first make a finding that they are manifestly
unjust or that the Court itself was unduly influenced.

Maby

v. Kay Peterson, 682 P.2d 287 and Clayton v. Crossroads, 655
P.2d 1125.

Also, in the case of Cowen & Company v. Atlas
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Stock Transfer, supra, the Court found that an award of
damages must be affirmed if there is evidence to support it.
In this case the activities of Western Capital and Securities

clearly

were

fraudulent with

intent

to deceive,

control and manipulate the market and would justify the
award of punitive damages, particularly

in view of the

testimony of the Defendant and the great anguish and financial difficulty occasioned by the activity and the subsequent lawsuit resulting.
Appellant attempts to state that the claim for punitive
damages is not properly pleaded

and then sets forth no

authority revealing how or in what manner it was not properly pleaded.

In the case of Stole v. Ted S. Finkle Invest-

ment Services, 48 9 F. Supp. 1209 and Sutton v. Schierson,
490 F. Supp. 98, the Court particularly allowed exemplary
damages which were requested in a properly pleaded pendent
State claim and if such damages are allowable under State
law and if a particular State violation for which punitive
damages

are

sought

Federal

violations.

is

alleged

The

fraud

in conjunction
and

illegal

with

activity

the
in

connection with the prayer for award of punitive damages is
further set forth in the second cause of action as follows:
"The Plaintiff has failed to comply in
any regard with this Rule, causing the
Plaintiff great damage in preventing her
from the free sale or alienation of the
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stock and any profits which may have
been generated thereby, all of which
shall be demonstrated at the time of
trial."
Finally, Appellant makes the argument that since no
general damages were awarded, punitive damages were not
proper and attempts to disregard the fact that the Court did
in fact award the stock which it valued at $30,000.00 to the
Respondent free and clear of any claims or encumbrances of
Appellant, and would also seek to distinguish the Court's
ruling in the case of Nash v. Craigco, 585 P. 2d 775, which
is a case similar to the one now before the Court in that
the party had breached a fiduciary duty and wrongfully acted
to destroy the Plaintiff's option in his control of a corporation.

The Court in that case states:
"The question whether punitive damages
can be given and the amount thereof
should be determined from the nature and
type of wrongful conduct rather than on
the amount of money awarded as actual
damages, since the purpose of an award
is to teach the offender not to repeat
the wrong and to be a warning to others
that such conduct is not to be tolerated."

Thus the award of punitive damages is amply supported
by case law and fact in this case and should be affirmed.

POINT VI.
THAT ANY AND ALL FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL
COURT WERE JUSTIFIED AND WERE AMPLY
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SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW AS
DETERMINED BY THE COURT.
With regard to the various arguments made in Appellant's Argument VI, in none of these is any authority that
that they are improper offered either by case law, statute
or otherwise, and appears to simply be some sort of attempt
to argue facts or logic on the part of Appellant.

Appel-

lant's own officers all testified that the sale could not be
concluded without the stock certificate and there is ample
evidence supporting the fact that the Appellant tied up the
Respondent's stock certificate at a time when it had insider
information and was attempting to gain profits for itself
due to the activity in the stock.

The rest of the findings

that Appellant seeks to dispute are basically undisputed in
the facts or are another interpretation of the facts which
are offered by Appellant.

CONCLUSION
The

facts and

law set forth

in Respondent's Brief

clearly show that the Court was justified in its ruling and
that there were adequate facts upon which the Court could
rely in making such a ruling.
favor

of

$30,000.00

Respondent
and

for
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stock
in

the

valued

at

amount

of

$10,000.00 are all entirely justified.

The ruling of the

District Court should be affirmed.
DATED this

of June 1987.

GERALD S. WIGHT
Attorney for Respondent
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